The Europe-Far East shipping route that traverses the Malacca and Singapore Straits and the South China Sea is one of the busiest in the world. Some 90% of Japan’s oil imports move through this region as do most of the oil imports of the Republic of Korea and Taiwan. Oil moving to China along this route is also increasing. Eastbound tankers proceeding along the Malacca/Singapore Straits through the South China Sea are generally loaded with crude oil from the Middle East and bound for East Asia. They also carry crude oil from Nigeria and Algeria3. The United States Navy also values these straits as well as the archipelagic sealanes through the Philippines and Indonesia as options increasing the mobility and flexibility of its Seventh Fleet. The United States also retains the option of using these straits to transport crude from the Middle East to its west coast.
If the Malacca/Singapore Straits were to be closed – – completely, or to certain vessels – – the principal link between the Indian and the South Pacific Oceans would be either the Sunda Strait to the South China Sea or the Lombok Strait to the Sulawesi Sea. For example, the alternative route for very large crude carriers(VLCCs), 200,000 – 300,000 gross registered tonnes(grt), and ultra large crude carriers(ULCCs), greater than 300,000 grt, with drafts too deep for the Malacca-Singapore Straits, is through the Lombok-Makassar Straits and the Sulawesi Sea south of Mindanao, through the Surigao Strait and on through eastern Philippine waters. VLCCs could save about 1,000 miles or 3 days by using the Malacca/Singapore Straits, and ULCCs coming from the direction of South Africa could save 200 miles4. But the real problem of alternative routes is that most of them pass through either Indonesian or the Philippine archipelagic waters and these countries could, in the worst scenario, seek to close not one but a series of alternative straits at the same time.
Although Malaysia and Indonesia advocate the use of the alternate route east of Bali and Borneo via the Straits of Lombok and Makassar for laden supertankers, very few, if any, follow this advice13. Indeed, almost all supertankers on the main oil route from the Arab Gulf to Northeast Asia use the Straits of Malacca and Singapore because it is the shortest route and, if necessary, they can use the facilities of the Port of Singapore, which is a significant logistical and operational advantage. Larger vessels within the range of 160,000 to 250,000 DWT are definitely testing the “officially” recommended draft limit of 18.5 meters when fully laden. Most tankers of the largest size observed in the region, over a quarter million DWT, operate well in excess of any official guideline when fully laden. However, many of the larger supertankers light load, i.e., take cargoes of less than maximum size, to reduce their draft when they sail through the Straits.
A significant percentage of vessel operators face a close judgment call regarding draft restrictions14. Loading too deep may ultimately contribute to an accident, while loading too light reduces profits. The decision is a trade-off between cost and safety. Supertankers may take as much as ten miles to stop, and they have little control at very slow speeds due to loss of steerageway. The watch officer may be forced to choose between the risk of a collision in the channels and the risk of running aground by leaving the channel.
The dramatic increase in marine casualties in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore since 1992 has prompted angry statements from important political figures in Malaysia and Indonesia. In particular, it has been suggested that the current system is no longer adequate and needs to be revised or at least reviewed15. Suggestions have also been made to either levy a toll on ships passing through the Straits or to make pilotage compulsory for ships passing through the narrowest portions.
However, closer examination of the problem revealed that many marine casualties could not be ascribed to a flaw in the TSS or its obsolescence. Statistics provided by all three Straits States revealed that over 90% of the casualties were caused by collisions–not groundings. The underlying reason for the marine casualties was therefore not hazards to navigation but poor seamanship. Apparently, most accidents were caused by ignorance of the basic rules of road such as “the right of way” of ships passing in opposite directions. Some collisions were also due to the inability of the crewmember at the wheel to understand English. This may be due to the hiring of sub-standard crews by “flag of convenience” vessel owners. This cost saving measure is employed because of continuing low world scale shipping rates and the increased costs of operating oil tanker fleets produced by the strict construction and other standards set by the IMO.
